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INTRODUCTION

On April 22, 2004, Tyler Chase Harper came to Poway High School
wearing a T-shirt with homemade lettering.' The shirt contained negative
1. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (mem). On March 5, 2007, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to Harper. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127
S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (mem). The Court denied leave for Harper's sister Kelsie to intervene as
a petitioner and subsequently declared the case moot, noting that the district court in the case
had already entered final judgment. Id. In spite of this fact, the issues discussed in Harper
are still very relevant.
In fact, on March 21, 2007, two students at Neuqua Valley High School in
Naperville, IL, Heidi Zamecnik and Alexander Nuxoll, filed a verified complaint in the
Northern District of Illinois seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against
their school and school district for their school's refusal to allow them to wear a t-shirt
substantially similar to the one Harper sought to wear. See Alliance Defense Fund, Copy of
the Complaint of Heidi Zamecnik, available at
http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ZamecnikComplaint.pdf.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

language regarding homosexuality. 2 Harper's second-period teacher, along
with the Assistant Principal and Principal of Poway, thought the shirt was a
violation of the school's dress code and asked Harper to remove the shirt.3
Harper refused, and he spent the rest of the day in the school office. 4 After
several school officials visited him throughout the day, the school sent
Harper home after classes were dismissed.5
Perhaps because of the T-shirt's language, or because of the high concentration of homosexual students at Poway High School and the history of
conflict between Poway's homosexual and heterosexual students,6 or
because of the self-proclaimed, strong religious convictions of Tyler
Harper, 7 the situation involving Harper's T-shirt did not end after the day
Harper spent in the principal's office. Harper and his parents filed a lawsuit
alleging that the school had violated Tyler's free speech rights, among other
claims. 8 After the trial court dismissed part of Harper's claim, a panel of
the Ninth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to balance and
examine the rights of students in a school environment against the rights of
school officials to assert their authority. In the end, the circuit court found
that the rights of homosexual students to be free from harsh and condemning words such as those appearing on Harper's T-shirt, were more
important than allowing Harper to voice his opinion in the way that he had
chosen. 9
In today's increasingly unstable school environment, it is beyond
doubt that sensitivity to the needs of all students should be of primary
importance. In ruling for the defendants, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals likely had this principle in mind when it stated its priority to be the
protection of homosexuals and other minorities in the school environment.10
Id.
2.
3. Id. at 1172.
4.
Id.
5. Id.
6.
Id. at 1171.
7.
Brief of Appellant at 9, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037).
8. Harper also alleged violations of his right to free exercise of religion, as well as
his rights under the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process
Clause. Harper,445 F.3d at 1173.

9.
Id. at 1179-80. In order to further prove this point, the majority introduced a
number of law review articles discussing the negative effects of a hostile school environment
upon homosexual students. Id. at 1179.
This is seen plainly in the majority opinion, which states:
10.
Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minority
groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and
physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate
them, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their
opportunity to learn.
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While this goal of the court seems admirable, the majority's opinion
produced a scathing dissent by Circuit Judge Kozinski, who felt that the
court was misinterpreting the evidence" and creating a standard that
unlawfully suppressed a political argument. 12 Even after a lengthy and
thorough opinion, however, Judge Kozinski admitted that even he was not
certain as to the solution that should be put forth to protect the minority
students at Poway High School, or that the circuit court was even the
correct forum for that solution; 3 he only knew that the court's answer in the
case would not suffice.
Was the Judge correct that the majority's opinion will become problematic? If so, what was his main concern? Perhaps most importantly, was
there a better way to reach the court's outcome? The intention of this case
note is to examine the statements of the majority and the dissent in order to
discern the positive and negative aspects of each. While this case note will
argue that the Ninth Circuit reached the right conclusion in its analysis of
Harper's free speech rights, 14 it will also argue that the court could have
used other Supreme Court cases and different circuit court cases to support,
or even replace its analysis. These other cases will show arguably less
controversial means of achieving the Ninth Circuit's desired outcomes, and
they will attempt to add a volatile issue.
II.

MAJOR SUPREME COURT CASES INVOLVING STUDENT SPEECH

Before discussing the Harpercase, it is necessary to review the Ninth
Circuit's recognition of three major U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with
student speech. 15 These three cases are: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
17
Community School District,16 Bethel School District No. 403. v. Fraser,
and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.18 Each case covers a distinct
type of free speech in the school environment, outlining when it is
appropriate for a school administrator to discipline a particular student.

Id. at 1178.
11.
Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
12.
Id. at 1197 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
13.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
14.
For an analysis stating that the HarperCourt may have been too restrictive in its
reading of student free speech rights, see Richard Fossey, Todd A. DeMitchell & Robert
LeBlanc, Harper v. Poway Unified School District: Schools Can Ban Demeaning Speech
Toward Vulnerable Students Without Offending The First Amendment, 211 EDUc. L. REP.

559 (2006).
15.
16.
17.
18.

Harper,445 F.3d at 1175.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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Chronologically, the first of these decisions examining school speech was
Tinker.
A.

TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENTSCHOOL DISTRICT

In Tinker, three students, Mary Beth and John Tinker, along with their
friend, Christopher Eckhardt, decided to wear black armbands to school in
protest of the Vietnam War.19 The school suspended each student and
refused to reinstate them until they agreed to return without their armbands.2 ° Christopher and the Tinkers filed suit to enjoin the school district
from disciplining them for wearing their black annbands. 2' The trial and
appellate courts upheld the school's actions as constitutional, so the
students appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 22
The Court in Tinker did much to outline the parameters for when a
student's behavior would not be protected under the Constitution. The
opinion by Justice Fortas began with the words that would be quoted by
countless school speech cases to come,23 stating, "It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 24

Justice Fortas then

described when school officials might be justified in regulating student
speech:
In order for... school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion ... [the school] must be

able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid.., an unpopular viewpoint.25
...school officials cannot suppress "expressions
of feel26
ings with which they do not wish to contend.,
The majority opinion continued by stating that a student may constitutionally exercise his free speech rights within school walls, so long as the
student does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
19.
393 U.S. at 504.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 505.
23.
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986); Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 266; Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1992).
24.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
25.
Id. at 509.
26.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).

20071

THE WRONG PATH TO THE RIGHT OUTCOME?

requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, and
without colliding with the rights of others. 27 Examining the case before it,
Justice Fortas noted that the students had not caused any disruption in the
school, interfered with any of the other students' rights, 28 or given school
authorities any reason to "forecast substantial disruption of or material
,29 Additionally, it appeared from
interference with school activities ....
the record that the school did not prohibit the wearing of any symbol with
political significance and had thus singled out the armbands protesting the
Vietnam War.30 Seeing that the ban on the armbands was related to little
else, aside from suppressing an "unpopular viewpoint," the Court reversed,
3
holding the actions of the school authorities to be unconstitutional. '
B.

BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER

Nearly seventeen years after the Court's decision in Tinker, the Court
examined the free speech rights of Matthew Fraser, a high school student
who had given a sexually suggestive nominating speech at a school
assembly.32 Fraser gave the speech on behalf of a friend running for a
student council position.3 3 The speech caused quite a stir at the school
assembly, and at least one teacher reported having to use an entire class
period to discuss Fraser's speech with the class.34 Citing a school disciplinary rule, 5 the school suspended Fraser for three days and removed him

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 514.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
Id. at 677. The nominating speech that Fraser gave was as follows:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students
of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things
in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between
you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34.
Id. at 678.
35.
In language likely constructed from the language in Tinker, the rule stated,
"Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is
prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id.
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from a list of candidates for graduation speaker.36 After appealing and
losing through the school district's grievance process, Fraser and his father
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
alleging a violation of his free speech rights under the First Amendment.37
Fraser sought monetary and injunctive relief, requesting the reinstatement
of his name to the list of graduation speakers. 38 The district court granted
Fraser relief, and the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court affirmed, finding that
Fraser's speech was indistinguishable from Tinker's armband.3 9
The Supreme Court did not see the similarity. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, the Court recognized the continued need for tolerance of
various controversial viewpoints, but stated the need for schools to
inculcate the "habits and manners of civility" and "[teach] students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior., 40 Burger also stated that
speech which might be protected in other public settings would not receive
similar protection in the school environment, 41 and that it was essentially
the job of schools to ensure that "lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and
conduct" be excluded from the teaching of values in the school curriculum. 42 Finding Fraser's speech "plainly offensive, 4 3 the Court held that44the
school district acted within its bounds of authority by punishing Fraser.
C.

HAZEL WOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. KUHLMEIER

The most recent decision in the triumvirate of U.S. Supreme Court
school free speech cases began when students in the Journalism II course at
Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri, tried to publish
an issue of Spectrum, the high school's newspaper, containing articles about
the effects of teenage pregnancy and the effects of divorce on certain
students in the school.45 Principal Robert Reynolds was concerned that
some of the students whose names were kept confidential might nonetheless
be identified, and that some of the topics, including birth control and sexual
activity, might be inappropriate for younger students.4 6 He directed
Spectrum's moderator, Howard Emerson, to remove the pages containing

36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 678-79.
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 679.
Id.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.

2007]

THE WRONG PATH TO THE RIGHT OUTCOME?

those articles and to publish the newspaper without them.4 7 The Journalism
H students filed suit, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for violations
of their First Amendment rights.4 8
After the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held
Principal Reynolds' actions "legitimate and reasonable, 4 9 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Spectrum was a
"public forum" for students. 50 The appellate court held that the newspaper
was free from censorship, so long as it did not materially or substantially
interfere with school activities or intrude upon the rights of others.51 In an
opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court reversed.5 2 In doing so, the
Court reaffirmed the language of Fraserthat the "rights of students in the
public schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings.' ,53

Having established this initial precept, the Court found that the school
officials had not created a public forum through Spectrum, since the
newspaper remained a classroom-related activity over which the Principal
and faculty moderator maintained a sufficient amount of control.54 Justice
White stated that "school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only
if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities
'for indiscriminate use by the general public.' "55 He added, "[E]ducators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. 5 6
Through these three cases, a sort of framework for school speech takes
shape. Tinker provides that a student has the right to express an opinion on
controversial subjects if he does so without "materially and substantially
interfering" with schoolwork and school discipline, and if he does so
without the "invasion of the rights of others. 57 Fraserprovides that schools
may establish appropriate societal behavior and values for students, and in

47.
Id. at 263-64. It should be noted that it was the commonly-accepted practice
that page proofs of Spectrum were submitted to Principal Reynolds before publication. Id. at
263.

48.

Id. at 264.

50.
51.
52.

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265.
Id. This language was taken almost verbatim from Tinker. 393 U.S. at 513.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.

49.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.

Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.675, 682 (1986)).

Id. at 268.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 273.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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58
doing so, schools may suppress "lewd, indecent, or offensive conduct.,
Hazelwood establishes that school officials may exercise editorial control
over school activities and student speech so long as the school has not
opened a "public forum," and the actions of school administrators are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 59 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals began its examination of Tyler Harper's school
speech claims against this framework, using the various holdings as its
guide.

111.
A.

HARPER v. POWAY UNIFIEDSCHOOL DISTRICT: BACKGROUND

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2004, the student Gay-Straight Alliance of Poway High
School planned to observe a "Day of Silence, ' 6° in which participating
students wore duct tape over their mouths, speaking in class only through a
designated speaker.6 1 The alleged purpose of the "Day of Silence" was to
62
demonstrate the "silencing effect" of homosexual intolerance in society,
and according to the Assistant Principal of Poway, to "teach tolerance of
others, particularly those of a different sexual orientation., 63 The GayStraight Alliance also held the "Day of Silence" in 2003, and according to
several school officials, numerous altercations and incidents occurred,
resulting in the suspension of a number of students. 64
On April 22, 2004, Tyler Harper wore a T-shirt to school with handwritten lettering that he had evidently done himself. 65 The front of the Tshirt said, "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD
58.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 683.
59.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
60.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171. The facts presented by Harper in the district court
seemed to allege that the school itself was sponsoring the "Day of Silence." Harper v. Poway
Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 2004). In his appellate brief,
however, Harper seems to allege that the Gay-Straight Alliance and the school were joint
sponsors of the "Day of Silence." Brief of Appellant at 20-21, Harper v. Poway Unified
Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037).
61.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171 n.3.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 1171.
64.
Id. Tension between homosexual and heterosexual students at Poway High
School was nothing new. In 2005, a jury awarded $300,000 to two Poway students who
claimed physical and emotional harassment had occurred at the hands of their classmates.
Dana Littlefield, Jury Finds in Favor of Two Gay Students; They Said They Were Harassed
at School, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB., June 9, 2005, at NC-1.
65.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171. Apparently, Harper had worn the same T-shirt with
slightly different language the day before, but no school officials claimed to have seen the
shirt that day. Id.
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On the back were the words,
HAS CONDEMNED. 6 6
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27.' ,67 Upon seeing the
shirt, David LeMaster, Harper's second-period teacher, told Harper that the
shirt was in violation of the school's dress code, that it was "inflammatory.
[and] created a negative and hostile working environment for others. 68
Harper refused to remove the shirt, and LeMaster sent him to the office for
violating the school's dress code.69
The Assistant Principal of Poway, Lynell Antrim, also told Harper that
his shirt was inflammatory and could cause disruption in the school.7 °
Antrim suggested ways that Harper and students of his faith could
positively communicate their beliefs without being derogatory. 7 ' She told
him that he would be permitted to return to class if he removed the shirt or
turned it inside out, but Harper still refused.72 Principal Scott Fisher then
talked with him in an effort to explain that it was not healthy for students to
be addressed in the derogatory manner presented by Harper's shirt, and that
it was the school's intention to avoid physical conflict on campus. 7 3 Harper
still refused to remove his T-shirt, and actually asked to be suspended.74
Fisher refused, choosing instead to keep Harper in the front office for the
rest of the day.75
While Harper was in the office, Deputy Sheriff Norman Hubbert approached Harper and began interrogating him to find out whether he was a
" 'dangerous student.' ,,76 Hubbert claimed that he had a "casual conversation" with Harper about his shirt, the scripture reference, and the Bible
itself.77 Near the end of the school day, Assistant Principal Ed Giles

66. Id.
67.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
68.
Id.
69.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1172.
70.
71.
Id.
72. Id.
73.
Id. Fisher asserted that his decision was particularly influenced by the previous
year's altercations. Id.
74. Id.
75.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1172.
76. Id. Apparently, Principal Fisher requested Hubbert to be on campus that day
because the school had received a call that morning, from someone purporting to be a parent,
protesting the school's condoning the "Day of Silence," and threatening to "do something
about it." Id. at 1172-73 n.7.
Id.at 1173. In his brief, Harper alleged that Hubbert had tried to coerce him into
77.
changing his beliefs and that during the course of their conversation, Hubbert had told
Harper, with Hubbert's firearm visible, that he "should not be offensive to others, since
Christianity is based on love, not hate." Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Harper v. Poway
Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037).
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checked in on Harper and had a conversation with him. 78 In the course of
this conversation, Giles expressed his desire that Harper, " 'express himself
in a more positive way.' ,79 Additionally, Giles explained to Harper that,
although he shared similar beliefs as Harper, he " '[left] his faith in the
car,' " when he entered his work environment and that Harper should do the
same. 80 After the school day ended, school officials instructed Harper to
proceed directly home.8' The school did not officially suspend Harper or
count him absent for any part of the day.82
B.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2004, Harper, through his parents, filed a lawsuit against
the Poway School District in the District Court for the Southern District of
California.83 Harper alleged violations of his free speech rights, his right to
free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Due Process Clause. 84 After the school district filed a
motion to dismiss, Harper filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
seeking to enjoin the school from violating his constitutional rights. 85 The
district court was not persuaded by Harper's equal protection or due process
claims and granted the school's motion to dismiss these claims.86 However,
the district court denied the school board's motion to dismiss all of Harper's
First Amendment claims, stating that the evidence might suggest that
Harper could be able to prove some set of facts that would establish
violations of his First Amendment rights.87 However, the district court
denied Harper's motion for preliminary injunction, holding that even
though his free speech, free exercise, and Establishment Clause claims
survived the motion to dismiss, the evidence failed to establish that Harper

78.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1173.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. Harper claimed that Giles' words were also an attempt to change his beliefs.
Brief of Appellant at 13, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 04-57037).
81.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1173.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. Harper also brought a state law claim, based on California Civil Code,
Section 52.1, which created a private cause of action for a violation of his federal and state
constitutional rights. Id. Harper claimed that he was threatened, intimidated, and coerced to
give up his constitutional rights by school authorities. The court deemed the claim improper
to hear in the district court and dismissed it. Id.
85.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1173.
86.
Id.
87.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103-06 (S.D. Cal.
2004).
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could succeed on the merits.88 Harper filed an interlocutory appeal in
response, requesting that the Ninth Circuit Court determine whether he had
a likelihood of success on the merits of his free speech, free exercise, and
Establishment Clause claims. 89
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A.

HARPER'S FREE SPEECH AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its review of Harper's case
by restating what Harper needed to demonstrate in order to have his
preliminary injunction granted; " 'either (1) A combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in his
favor.' ,9-The court then commenced its review of the facts by examining
Harper's free speech rights, which he claimed were protected under Tinker
92
and Fraser.91 The court agreed that Tinker governed Harper's complaint,
but the court disagreed with the district court as to what provision of Tinker
governed.9 3 The majority felt that Harper's actions had amounted to
conduct that violated the holding in Tinker forbidding students to "intrude
upon ... the rights of other students. 94 The court explained that "plainly
offensive speech" may interfere with the rights of other students, and that
Harper's T-shirt " 'colli[des] with the rights of other students' in the most
fundamental way.' ,95
88.
Id.atl119-21.
89.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1173. See also, Brief of Appellant at 9, 35, Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037).
90.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1174 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)). The court also noted that the standard of review dictated
overruling the district court only for clear error or abuse of discretion. Id.
91.
Harper also claimed that the school's actions amounted to viewpoint
discrimination under Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995), and that the school board's dress code was overbroad under Bd. Of Airport Comm'rs
of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). Id. at 1175.
In deciding that Tinker controlled, the court cited the Ninth Circuit case of
92.
Chandlerv. McMinnville School District, which divided school speech into three categories:
"(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech which is governed by Fraser, (2)
school-sponsored speech which is governed by Hazelwood, and (3) all other speech which is
governed by Tinker." Id. at 1176-77 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d
524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted)).
93.
The district court felt that the "reasonably ...forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities" prong governed. Id. at 1175.
94.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1175.
Id. at 1178 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
95.
508 (1969)).
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Continuing its examination of Harper's speech, the Ninth Circuit
Court condemned speech that made members of historically oppressed
minority groups feel inferior.96 Judge Reinhardt noted that it was of
particular importance that gay and lesbian students not be subjected to such
hostile environments. 97 He cited law reviews and other studies to show that
homosexual students who were subject to such verbal assaults faced
impediments to their social and educational development by creating
feelings of inferiority in these students.9 8 However, the court was careful to
note that it was not calling for a blanket ban on all controversial messages
in the school environment, especially messages that were overwhelmingly
political. 99 "[W]e limit our holding to instances of derogatory and injurious
remarks directed at students' minority status such as race, religion, and
sexual orientation," wrote Judge Reinhardt. 1°° The court thus affirmed the
district court's holding that Harper would be unlikely to succeed on the
merits of his free speech claim.101 Resolving the question of Harper's right
to wear his T-shirt under the "rights of others" prong of Tinker, the court
next found that it did not need to discuss whether the school 10could
ban
2
Harper's shirt under the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker.
Continuing to Harper's next claim, the court held that the school had
not exercised impermissible viewpoint discrimination by forbidding Harper
to wear his T-shirt. 10 3 In so holding, the court essentially repeated its
interpretation of the Tinker holdings, stating that schools have the right to
exercise viewpoint discrimination if a certain viewpoint constitutes a
material disruption of the education process, or interferes with the rights of
other students, the latter of which Harper's T-shirt had done. °4 Reinhardt
concluded his analysis on this point by stating that a school could permit
"discussions of tolerance, equality and democracy without being required to

96.
Id. at 1178-79.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 1179.
99.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1182. Judge Reinhardt also took dissenting Judge Kozinski
to task for noting that there was political disagreement about homosexuality in the country,
and that derogatory messages towards homosexuals should therefore be allowed as a form of
political speech. Id. Judge Reinhardt acknowledged the political disagreement while stating
that there was an appropriate time and place for such political discussion, and that, "[i]t is
not necessary to do so by condemning ... students trying to obtain a fair and full education
in our public schools." Id. at 1181.
100.
Id. at 1183.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 1184.
103.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1184.
104.
Id. at 1184-85.
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provide equal time for student or other speech espousing intolerance,
bigotry or hatred."' 0 5
B.

HARPER'S FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS

The court next examined Harper's Free Exercise of Religion claim in
complex detail, outlining several cases describing when a plaintiffs Free
Exercise right has been violated. Noting the case Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 106 the court began by
stating that government may not compel affirmation of a religious belief,
punish religious expressions that it believes to be false, impose disabilities
upon certain religions, or side with one religious authority in a controversy. 10 7 Continuing its description of Smith, the court stated that an
individual may not disregard a valid and neutral law of general applicability
simply because it proscribes conduct that the individual may seek to
practice for religious purposes. 0 8 Citing the final holding of Smith, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a law which burdens the
right to Free Exercise, together with another constitutional right,1°9 would
be subject to strict scrutiny.' 10 In such cases, the court noted that Sherbert v.
Verner111 would govern. 1 2 Sherbert held that government actions substantially burdening the practice of religion must be narrowly tailored to serve
governmental interests.113 The court finally held that in order for a plaintiff
should be able to prove "a fair
to be able to assert such a claim, he' 14
probability ... of success on the merits.
Harper asserted that his Free Exercise claim was one of the "hybrid
rights" claims described above, which effectively burdened his right to free
exercise of religion along with other constitutional rights, and that the
school's actions were consequently subject to strict scrutiny. 1 5 The Ninth
105.
Id.at 1185.
106.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
107.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1186 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
108.
Id. at 1186 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877). The Court in Smith also held that, "[A] neutral law of general
applicability need not be supported by a compelling governmental interest even though it has
the incidental effect of burdening religion." Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990)).
109.
The Smith Court called this a "hybrid claim." Id. at 1187.
110. Id.
111.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
112. Harper,445 F.3d at 1187.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 1187.
115.
Id. In the section of his brief that outlines his "hybrid rights" claim, Harper
vaguely stated that the school's actions to suppress his speech violated, "numerous
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Circuit Court expressed its doubt that there was any likelihood that Harper
would succeed on his Free Exercise claim. 1 6 The court explained that,
even if the school's actions were subject to strict scrutiny, Harper would not
succeed17because the school did not punish him for expressing his religious
1
views.
Harper next claimed that the Poway officials had violated his right to
Free Exercise by attempting to change his religious views. 1 8 According to
Harper, Detective Hubbert's presence and Assistant Principal Giles'
statement about "keeping his faith in the car" were efforts by school
authorities, representing the State by working for a State institution, to
change his religious beliefs.11 9 The court looked closely at the statements
and noted that Detective Hubbert told Harper that he "should" not be
offensive to others, which in the court's opinion, amounted to nothing more
than an opinion to which Harper was not obliged to listen. 20 The court
next found that Giles' comments were not suggestions, but statements made
by Giles to indicate that he "leaves his own faith in the car" during the
school day.' 2 ' The court concluded its examination of Harper's Free
Exercise claim by finding that Poway was within its authority to discipline
Harper through its power to incorporate habits and manners of
civility
122
necessary for society, paraphrasing one of the holdings of Fraser.
Finally, the court examined Harper's claim that the school had violated
the Establishment Clause because it had attempted to change his religious
beliefs about homosexuality. 23 The court began by noting that Harper's
Establishment Clause claim was essentially making the same argument as
his Free Exercise claim. 124 Citing the United States Supreme Court case of
constitutional provisions." Brief of Appellant at 41, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445
F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037). Perhaps the court would have been more
persuaded to examine this claim had Harper tied his Free Exercise claim to some specific
constitutional violation, but the court presumed that Harper was referring to his free speech
right anyway. Harper,445 F.3d at 1187.
116. Id.
117.
Id. at 1188.
118. Id. at 1189.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121.
This finding is extremely puzzling, if not outright wrong, considering that
Harper's brief stated that Giles not only said that he "left his faith in the car" but that Harper
"must also 'leave his faith in the car.' " Brief of Appellant at 13, Harper v. Poway Unified
Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037). Poway's brief confirms that this
was the case. Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 5, Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-57037).
122. Harper,445 F.3d at 1190 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,125 the Ninth
Circuit iterated that Establishment Clause claims, for the most part, had
addressed government efforts to favor particular religions. 126 Further, the
court held that allegations that the government disfavored a particular
religion were properly analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause. 127 Going
into further detail, the court cited the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 28 which
established that "government conduct does not violate the Establishment
Clause when (1) it has a secular purpose, (2) its principal and primary effect
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster excessive
government entanglement in religion."'' 29 Finding that the school's actions
were completely secular and free from any kind of religious establishment
or entanglement, the Ninth Circuit Court found that Harper would be
unlikely to succeed on his Establishment Clause claim. 130 Finding no other
valid issues, the court denied Harper's motion13 1for a preliminary injunction
and affirmed the findings of the district court.
C.

THE DISSENT

The majority opinion was followed by a long and sometimes scathing
dissent by Circuit Judge Kozinski. Judge Kozinski agreed that Tinker, and
not Hazelwood or Frasergoverned Harper's case. 32 This being the case,
Judge Kozinski felt that the school district had not presented enough
evidence to meet the "material and substantial interference with schoolwork
and discipline" standard enunciated by Tinker.'33 The only evidence that
the school district had put forth, according to Judge Kozinski, was that
David LeMaster had noticed students "off-task" talking about the T-shirt,
and that Harper had held "heated" conversations with other students, both
of which fell drastically short of "disruption of the school environment"
that Judge Kozinski envisioned.134 Judge Kozinski was equally unpersuaded
125.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
126.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)).
127.
Id.
128.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
130.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1191.
131.
Id. at 1192. Harper also asked the court to re-examine the district court's

dismissal of his Due Process and Equal Protection claims, arguing that these claims were
"inextricably intertwined" with his motion for a preliminary injunction. The court declined
to reexamine the claims. Id.
132. Harper,445 F.3d at 193 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
133.
Id. at 1193.
134.
Id. at 1193-94. To illustrate his idea of "off-task" talking, Judge Kozinski cited
several famous movies and television shows, which was mockingly criticized by the

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

by school officials' claims that they were concerned about the potential for
altercations similar to those that had happened on the "Day of Silence" in
the past, which were due to certain T-shirts with defamatory slogans on
them. 135 Judge Kozinski thought that this was primarily because the
evidence that the officials presented did not indicate that a T-shirt with
language
similar to the one that Harper wore had caused these alterca36
tions. 1
Judge Kozinski next criticized the majority's decision to uphold the
37
school's actions toward Harper as teaching tolerance and civic virtues.'
He pointed out the political and moral disagreement about homosexuality in
the country, and he suggested that part of the problem with the "Day of
Silence" was that it forced the issue of homosexuality into the school
environment in the first place. 38 Judge Kozinski suggested that "[g]iven
the history of violent confrontation between those who support the "Day of
Silence" and those who oppose it the school authorities may have been
justified in banning the subject altogether by denying both sides permission
to express their views during the school day."' 9 He then concluded his
analysis by expressing his opinion that the school had carried out viewpoint
discrimination by suppressing Harper's T-shirt.'4°
Harper's shirt seemed to contain words that were, "more like the 'simple acts of teasing and name-calling,' described . . . as non-actionable in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education," said Judge Kozinski.""
However, Judge Kozinski agreed with the majority that student speech
could be restricted under Tinker if that speech collided with the "rights of
others," but he did not think that Harper's T-shirt had included such
speech. 42 He then decried the majority's reliance on various law review
articles, dismissing them as "a few law review articles, a couple of press
majority in their opinion. Harper,445 F.3d at 1181 n.23 ("Our dissenting colleague's notion
of 'evidence' appears to be rather odd. It seems to consist largely of motion pictures and
television shows . . . Perhaps he would prefer us to cite Brokeback Mountain (Paramount
Pictures 2005) or The Matthew Shepard Story (2002), as evidence of the harmful effects of
anti-gay harassment...").
135.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1194-95 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority,
Judge Kozinski appears to have ignored the story about the two Poway students who had
won a lawsuit against the school district for harassment and abuse. See Harper,445 F.3d at
1172.
136.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1195 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1196.
138.
Id.
139. Id. at 1197.
140. Id.
141.
Id. at 1198 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 652
(1999)).
142.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1197-98 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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releases ... and some pop psychology."'' 43 He felt that there simply was
not enough evidence anywhere that conclusively proved that homosexual
students suffered extremely adverse effects from "any and all statements
casting aspersions on their sexual orientation."' 144 This being the case,
Judge Kozinski concluded that the majority's ruling was essentially created
problematic for schools and students in
out of whole
45 cloth, and would prove
the future. 1
Finally, Judge Kozinski went on to protest the majority's failure to
address Harper's claim that Poway High School's Harassment Policy was
overbroad.' 46 After essentially printing the Administrative Procedure
section of the policy verbatim in his opinion, 147 Judge Kozinski criticized
the policy as prohibiting far more speech than the "vulgar" speech defined
148
in Fraser, or speech "causing substantial disruption" under Tinker.
Judge Kozinski thought that the Harassment Policy was far more broad and
restrictive of student speech than the Harassment Policy overturned by the
Third Circuit in Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist. 149 and he felt that Saxe
should be used to overturn the policy here as well. 50 Judge Kozinski then
concluded his analysis by reiterating that, because of the lack of evidence
presented by the school district, and because of the substantial suppression
of speech contained in the district's harassment policy, Harper would likely
succeed on his claims, and that the only option for the court was to
reverse.151
V.

ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the "rights of others" prong of
Tinker controlled Harper's claims 152 obviously met with strong disagreement from Circuit Judge Kozinski. One of the main reasons for Kozinski's
prolonged dissent appears to be his feelings that the majority was not
focusing enough on the facts of the case. 153 It is true that the majority spent
a great deal of its analysis on the special protection that must be afforded to
minority students, 154 but another and perhaps a better reason for the lack of
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
See id. at 1202-04.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1205 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
Harper,445 F.3d at 1205-06 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id.at 1207
Id. at 1175 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1193-95 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1178-83 (majority opinion).
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consensus between the judges was that there was better precedent to be
applied. This next section will discuss whether another prong of Tinker
might have been better for the court to apply in achieving the outcome that
it did. It will also examine a proposition that the court in Harper failed to
examine: whether the precedent of Fraser and Hazelwood could also have
been applied to reject Harper's claims.
A.

RE-EXAMINING TINKER PRECEDENT

The majority felt that the "rights of others" prong of Tinker should
govern based on a framework constructed from two other Circuit Court
cases: Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist.,155 and West v. Derby Unified
Sch. Dist.156 Quoting from the Chandler holding, the Ninth Circuit Court
explained that "plainly offensive speech 'by definition, may well impinge[ ]
upon the rights of other students,' even if the speaker does not directly
accost individual students with his remarks." 157 Using the West holding, the
HarperCourt explained that an offensive display (namely, the Confederate
flag in West), might interfere with the rights of other students, even though
a student was never physically accosted. 158 From these two holdings, the
court rationalized that, though Harper had not physically accosted anyone,
and though his T-shirt did not
contain vulgar speech, it could impinge upon
159
the rights of other students.
The way that the HarperCourt used these two precedents is problematic. It must be noted that Chandleris highly distinguishable from Harper's
case. Chandler involved two high school students who wore protest
buttons and stickers to the classes of replacement teachers during a
teacher's strike. 160 The students in Chandler were told to remove their
6
protest buttons, but no other disciplinary action was taken against them.' '
The students subsequently filed suit for infringement upon their free speech
rights, and after the district court dismissed the case, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 62 In doing so, the Chandler Court did not deal at all with the
issue of student speech that impinged upon the rights of other students,
155. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
156. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
157. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177-78 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978
F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)).
158. Id. at 1178 (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th
Cir. 2000)).
159. Id. at 1178.
160. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1992). Some
of the buttons and stickers with the language in question said things like "Scab we will never
forget," "I'm not listening scab," and "Do scabs bleed?" Id.
161. Id. at 526.
162. Id. at 530.
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holding instead that the speech suppressed by the school was not inherently
disruptive.163 At best, Chandler contained a loose framework for when
school speech might be suppressed, but the case did little to define, "vulgar,
lewd, or plainly offensive" speech in the school environment, and it did
nothing to define such speech in terms of conflicts between students.' 64
Chandlerwas arguably a bad precedent for the court to follow in this case.
Some of the facts in West are also distinguishable. In West, a seventh
grade student, T.W., was suspended for drawing a Confederate flag during
math class, in violation of a school district racial harassment policy.16 ' The
facts in West somewhat paralleled the Harpercase because West involved a
student who was suspended for displaying an offensive symbol in a school
district with a history of tension between diverse groups of students.166
However, the tension involved in West was racial in nature, 67 and the
plaintiff in the case was a middle school student with a history of making
racially derogatory statements towards other students. 168 Moreover, the
school district in West acted to punish T.W. pursuant to clear violations of a
Racial Harassment policy that had been enacted precisely because of the
number of racial incidents that had occurred in the school district.1 69 In
Harper, however, the record contained no history of specific incidents
between Harper and homosexual students, and the policy upon which he
was suspended was the school's dress code, though no specific aspect of the
1 70
dress code was mentioned as being the chief cause of disciplinary action.
The factual connection between Harperand West thus seems a bit tenuous,
at first.
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Ninth Circuit's use of West was the
fact that its analysis of that case ceased with the explanation that the mere
display of the Confederate flag could be deemed offensive by a school,
"even though there was no indication that any student was physically
7
accosted with the [Confederate] flag, aside from its general display."'
163.
Id.
164.
See id. at 528-29.
165.
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 2000). The
policy provided in relevant part that "District employees and students shall not at school, on
school property or at school activities wear or have in theirpossession any written material,
either printed or in their own handwriting that is racially divisive or creates ill will or
hatred." Id. (emphasis in original).
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 1361-62. The incidents of racial tension also appear to have been
numerous, with reports of racial slurs on bathroom walls, and race-related incidents breaking
out on school buses and at football games. Id. at 1362.
168.
Id. at 1362-63.
169.
West, 206 F.3d at 1362.
170.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).
171.
Id. at 1178 (citing West, 206 F.3d at 1366).
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What is not noted by the Ninth Circuit is that the West Court justified the
Derby school district's suspension of T.W. in part by using other parts of
Tinker precedent. The West Court began its analysis by citing the Tinker
prong, which states that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the freedom of expression."1 72 From this
basis, the West Court held that given the numerous incidents of racial
tension in the school district's history, school officials had reason to believe
that a racial conflict could result from T.W.'s actions, and there was
173 thus
more than "mere apprehension" of conflict to justify his suspension.
Explaining further, the West Court adopted the district court's analysis
of T.W.'s free speech claim, which noted, "The fact that a full-fledged
brawl had not yet broken out over the Confederate flag does not mean that
the district was required to sit and wait for one .... The district had the
power to act to prevent problems before they occurred. 1 74 It might be said
that the overall holding to come from West is that school officials may take
action to prevent conflict between groups of students when there is a history
of tension between those groups because that tension creates more than
"mere apprehension" that substantial disruption of the school environment
175
will result.
The Harper Court could have successfully used West to reject
Harper's claims under Tinker. Given that Poway's principal made clear
that he wished to " 'avoid physical conflict on campus,' ,,176 and that
conflicts between homosexuals and heterosexuals were occurring before,
during, and after the "Day of Silence,"1 77 the court might have held that the
school district properly suppressed Harper's T-shirt because the district had
more than "mere apprehension" that a conflict would result from Harper's
wearing the T-shirt and that substantial disruption of the school environment would have resulted from such a conflict.1 78 This way, the court could
have achieved its goal of protecting the rights of homosexual students while
172.
West, 206 F.3d at 1366 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
173.
Id. at 1366.
174.' Id.
175.
See id.
176.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1172.
177.
Id.
The school district made this exact argument in its answer to the complaint:
178.
[G]iven the fact that the Poway Unified School District and Poway High
School officials have been sued by gay and lesbian students for an alleged failure to protect such students against harassment and bigotry at
school, officials had every reason to be concerned about the well-being
of gay and lesbian students.
Answer at 8, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2004)
(No. 04-57037).
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also achieving another important and legitimate goal, that of allowing
school administrators to take preventative action to avoid conflicts that
could disrupt the school environment. The Ninth Circuit also would have
avoided its lengthy discussion about upholding the emotional well-being of
homosexual students which, while a perfectly honorable and legitimate
goal, tends to be controversial and polarizing, as Judge Kozinski's dissent
undoubtedly proves. If the Ninth Circuit had looked more closely at the
West case, it could have found against Harper, upheld many of the same
goals it wished to uphold, and remained consistent with Tinker,179 while
possibly achieving a greater consensus within the court.
B.

EXAMINING FRASER PRECEDENT

Arguably, the Harper Court also had the option to choose to avoid
examining Harper's claims under Tinker by using Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser'80 as its guiding precedent. The Poway School District
argued in its answer to the complaint that since Harper's speech was
"plainly offensive," Fraser should be the controlling precedent.' 8' The
Ninth Circuit noted that Chandlerestablished that Frasergoverned "vulgar,
lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech," but the court refused to
consider any Fraserargument without much explanation. 8 2 The court only
stated that it need not consider the argument for Fraser, since Harper's
claims would be decided under Tinker.183 Had the court chosen to examine
Harper's claims under Fraser,it might have found that Frasercould deliver
a similar outcome against Harper and that there were supportive Fraser
interpretations from other circuits.
Fraserheld that schools are charged with the duty of inculcating habits and manners of civility in their students. 1 4 Fraseralso held that schools
may choose not to tolerate lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct
that is inconsistent with its educational mission. 15 Based on these
179.
Since it was entirely possible for the Ninth Circuit to use another prong of
Tinker to reach the same outcome in this case, Judge Kozinski's comment that "Perhaps
Tinker should be overruled" was, at the very least, premature, since the case's precedent is
not completely unworkable. Harper,445 F.3d at 1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
180.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
181.
Answer, at 7, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. 04-57037).
182.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1176.
183.
Id. The court does mention Fraserfrom time to time but only in passing. See
Harper,445 F.3d at 1183 ("Indeed, the inculcation of 'the fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system' is 'truly the work of the schools.'
(quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 683)).
184.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 681.
185.
Id. at 683.
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holdings, the Ninth Circuit could have rejected Harper's Free Speech
claims because his T-shirt was offensive and indecent speech to homosexual students who would have viewed it. Likewise, the court could have
held that the school was well within its bounds of authority in censoring
Harper because the T-shirt was contrary to the school's teachings of "habits
and manners of civility" since the T-shirt contained language that was
uncivil towards homosexual students. Had the majority in Harper used
Fraser as controlling precedent, it clearly could have written a majority
opinion that accomplished the same goals that it sought to achieve with the
Tinker precedent: protecting the rights of homosexual students and
upholding school authority to prohibit speech that is inconsistent with its
mission.
Using Fraser, the majority would have remained consistent with
precedents from other Circuits that had interpreted and adhered to Fraser.
A Sixth Circuit case that used Fraseras precedent, Boroff v. Van Wert City
Board of Education,186 curiously was not mentioned by the majority,
despite the factual similarities between the two cases. 187 The plaintiffappellant in Boroff also faced trouble from school administrators for
wearing a supposedly inflammatory T-shirt that supported rocker Marilyn
Manson. 188 Boroff's T-shirt contained a picture of a three-headed Jesus
with the words " 'See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth' " on the
front, and the word "BELIEVE," with the word "LIE" highlighted on the
back. 189 After telling Boroff that he was in violation of the school's dress
code, 190 a Van Wert High School principal's aide ordered him to either turn
the shirt inside-out, go home and put on another shirt, or stay home and be
counted truant. 19' Boroff chose to remain at home, but he came to school
192
the next three days, each day wearing a different Marilyn Manson shirt.
Each day, Boroff was refused the opportunity to remain at school. 193
186.
220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
187.
Perhaps this is because Boroff was criticized in another Ninth Circuit panel
opinion, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Frederick, delivered a few
months before the Harper opinion, declined to follow Boroff because the court felt that
Boroff implied "that student speech may be prohibited as 'plainly offensive' whenever it
conflicts with a vaguely-defined 'educational mission.' " Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1122.
Frederick had a distinguishable fact pattern though; unlike the scenario in Harper,the court
in Frederick dealt with a student display that was not openly derogatory towards other
students, and the court found that the disciplined student was not in a school environment in
the first place. Id. at 1119-20.
188.
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 466.
189.
Id. at 467.
190.
The dress code provided that " 'clothing with offensive illustrations, drug,
alcohol, or tobacco slogans ... are not acceptable.' " Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 467.
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Boroff subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, alleging a violation of his freedom of
expression.1 94 He requested a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order against the school, but both were denied by the district
court. 195 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and in doing so, the court noted its
agreement with the district court that Frasercontrolled because the case
involved suppression of vulgar or plainly offensive speech. 196 This being
the case, the Sixth Circuit held that the school's suppression of Boroff s Tshirt was not a violation of his free speech rights because the Van Wert
High School principal could rightfully decide that Marilyn Manson's
message, "promotes destructive conduct and demoralizing values that are
contrary to the educational mission of the school," consistent with
97
Fraser.1
The court also held that the suppression of the first Marilyn
Manson T-shirt that Boroff wore was allowable because the three-headed
figure of Jesus mocked the religious beliefs of other students, another
element that was contrary to the school's educational mission, which
encouraged respect for others' religious beliefs. 198 The court then
concluded its analysis by stating, "Where Boroffs T-shirts contain symbols
and words that promote values . . .so patently contrary to the school's
educational mission, the School has the authority . . . to prohibit those Tshirts."1 9 9

Another case using Fraserthat arguably supports the Harper Court's
analysis is the Eleventh Circuit case of Scott v. School Board of Alachua
County.200 Similar to West, Scott involved a challenge to a school's
suspension of two students who claimed that their free speech rights were
being violated due to their suppressed attempt to display the Confederate
flag on school grounds. 20 1 Similar to West, the Scott Court worked against
20 2
the background of a school district where racial tensions were evident.
The district court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.2 °3 In doing so, the appellate court
essentially adopted the reasoning of the district court.2
194. Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. at 469.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 470.
200.
324 F.3d 1246 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
201.
Id. at 1247.
202.
Evidently, one of the reasons for the students' suspensions was that there had
been a prior disruption in the school with a "racial impact." Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit in Scott first agreed with the district court that
the school may have reasonably feared "substantial disruption of the school
environment" under Tinker because of the racial tensions that had occurred
in the school.2 °5 The appellate court also supported the district court's
opinion that the school might have taken action against the plaintiffs as part
of its duty to "inculcate the habits and manners of civility," and "prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse," consistent with
Fraser.206 In so holding, the appellate court included the district court's
analysis of the offensiveness of the Confederate flag in the school
environment. 20 7 The district court had noted that while some see the
Confederate flag as a symbol of Southern history and heritage, others find
the flag to be a symbol of white supremacy. "The problem," the district
court noted, "is that both of them are correct., 20 8 Recognizing the volatility
of such an issue, the district court held that school officials would not only
be permitted to restrict expression on the issue, but that it was "their duty to
do so.
Arguably either or both of the Boroff or Scott precedents would have
been good precedent for the Ninth Circuit to apply had they examined the
Fraserstandard in the case. 210 The court could have followed Boroff and
held that the offensive language of Harper's T-shirt demoralized the values
of homosexual students, and that Poway had the same right as Van Wert
High School had to suppress a T-shirt that was derogatory and contrary to
the school's educational mission. 211 The Ninth Circuit also could have
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11 th Cir. 2003).
205.
Id. at 1248. Though the district and appellate courts in Scott did not openly
206.
endorse the theory, the opinions cited another case from the Eleventh Circuit that has
suggested that the Tinker and Fraser standards could be applied together when analyzing
school speech decisions. See Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267,
1274 (11th Cir. 2000).
207.
Scott, 324 F.3d at 1248-49.
208.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
209.
210.
But see Cindy Lavorato and John Saunders, Commentary, Public High School
Students, T-shirts and Free Speech: UntanglingThe Knots, 209 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6, 7 (West
2006) (calling Boroff "the case that arguably stretches Fraserto its outermost limits," and
stating that the Sixth Circuit ignored the lewd manner of the speech upon which Fraser was
punished); Anthony B. Schutz, Note, Public School Restrictions on "Offensive" Student
Speech in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000): Has
Fraser's "Exception"Swallowed Tinker's Rule? 81 NEB. L. REv. 443, 461 (2002) (criticizing
the Boroff Court for reading Fraseras giving "unfettered school authority to restrict vulgar,
lewd, or offensive speech," and ignoring the Tinker standard).
Had the Ninth Circuit analyzed Boroff, it also might have analyzed the religious
211.
beliefs of homosexual students. If certain homosexual students held religious beliefs that
God loved homosexual and heterosexual people alike, perhaps the school might have
claimed it was suppressing speech that was offensive to another student's religious beliefs,
consistent with Boroff, as well as the school's Harassment Policy. See Harper v. Poway
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adopted the Scott Court's reasoning and recognized that, since there was
much potential for conflict over the volatile issue of homosexuality at
Poway, Harper's T-shirt was not "merely an intellectual discourse, '21 2 and
since some students would undoubtedly be offended by Harper's T-shirt,
the school had a duty to suppress it. Given the Ninth Circuit's recognition
of the tensions between homosexual and heterosexual students at Poway, z1 3
there can be no doubt that the court could conclude that Harper's T-shirt
was offensive and promoted values contrary to the school's educational
mission, consistent with Fraser. One must consequently question why the
Ninth Circuit would mostly disregard the Fraser standard, along with
precedents interpreting that standard, when examining Harper's claims.
C.

EXAMINING HAZELWOOD PRECEDENT

The Ninth Circuit also disregarded the case of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, even though, like Fraser,Hazelwood could have allowed
the court to reach the same outcome that it did using Tinker precedent.
Hazelwood established that school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on student speech, so long as no "public forum" had been
created by the school.214 The Hazelwood Court explained that "school
facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have
'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by
the general public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student
organizations. 2 5 The Court also noted that "educators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to pedagogical concerns. ' 2 16 Finding that the
school had maintained sufficient control over the school's student
newspaper, the Court held that no "public forum" had existed and granted
relief to the Hazelwood School District.217
The HarperCourt began its analysis by noting that neither party had
claimed that Hazelwood governed the case.21 8 However, Harper did claim
in his brief that the school had "opened the school forum to debate on the
Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1202 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("One such
prohibited item [in the school's Harassment Policy] is '[n]egative comments or behavior
based on... religion... ' ").
212.
See Scott, 324 F.3d at 1249.
213.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171.
214.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
215.
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)) (citation omitted).
216.
Id. at 273.
217.
Id. at 270.
218.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1176 n.15.
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homosexual lifestyle," through the "Day of Silence., 21 9 It is thus arguable
that the Harper Court might have analyzed the case through Hazelwood
precedent by examining whether Poway High School had created a public
forum through its allowance of the "Day of Silence." If the court found that
the school did not open itself as a public forum for debate on homosexuality
because it had -maintained sufficient control over the "Day of Silence," the
school's restrictions on Harper's speech might have been reasonable under
Hazelwood as an exercise of editorial control over speech related to a
school-sponsored activity. 220 This would allow the court to reach the same
outcome in favor of the school district that it had reached by using Tinker.
Before the court may hold this way, the question must be answered as
to whether the school had opened itself as a public forum through the "Day
of Silence." As the Hazelwood precedent stated, to create a public forum,
the school has to have opened itself for indiscriminateuse by the general
public or student organizations. 1 While it is beyond doubt that the
sponsor of the "Day of Silence," the Poway Gay-Straight Alliance, 2
would be considered a student organization, whether they had "indiscriminate use" of school facilities is unclear because that term is not defined in
Hazelwood. Some cases have attempted to define "indiscriminate use" by
establishing what it is not. In the case cited by Hazelwood that introduces
this language, Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association, 3 the Supreme Court held that when the use of a school mail
system requires permission from the school principal, this does not
constitute "indiscriminate use. 224 Moreover, both the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits have held that requiring express permission from school officials to
use school facilities does not constitute "indiscriminate use" of those
facilities by students.225
While the evidence surrounding the circumstances upon which the
"Day of Silence" occurred is not abundant, Harper claims in his brief that
the school authorized the event.22 6 Additionally, the appellate court in
Harper stated that the school had "permitted" the "Day of Silence" in
219.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 21, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-57037).
220.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-271.
221.
Id. at 267.
222.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171.
223.
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
224.
Id. at 47.
225.
See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 941
2000); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 887 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1989).
226.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-57037).

445 F.3d

(5th Cir.
935, 942
445 F.3d
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2003227 and that before the 2004 "Day of Silence," the Gay-Straight
Alliance was required to consult with the principal to prevent potential
altercations. 228 This required consultation with the principal suggests that
the Gay-Straight Alliance was not given unfettered discretion to conduct the
"Day of Silence" on school property, but in fact had to conduct the event
with certain restrictions. Therefore, it is likely the HarperCourt could have
determined that the school did not permit "indiscriminate use" of school
grounds for the "Day of Silence," within the understanding of that term in
Hazelwood, and that the school did not open itself as a public forum.
Since the Ninth Circuit could have found that Poway High School did
not open a public forum through the "Day of Silence," the next question to
ask is whether their censorship of Harper's T-shirt was an exercise of
"editorial control over . . . [a] school-sponsored

. . .

activit[y]" that was

related to "legitimate pedagogical concerns. 22 9 While it is clear that
Harper wore his T-shirt in response to the "Day of Silence,, 230 whether
Poway High School actually sponsored the "Day of Silence" is questionable. In his brief, Harper stated that the Gay-Straight Alliance actually
sponsored the event,231 but he also claimed that school officials endorsed
the homosexual lifestyle on that day.232 In its brief, the school district
neither confirms nor denies that it sponsors the "Day of Silence," but it
acknowledges that Harper alleges as much.2 33 Regardless, the record
showed that the "Day of Silence" happened on school grounds and was
conducted by a student organization within the school. 234 This, taken
without an outright denial by the school that it sponsored the "Day of
Silence," seems to suggest that it is reasonable to believe that the school
sponsored, or allowed itself to sponsor the "Day of Silence."
Since it could be said that the school did not open itself as a public
forum, and that the "Day of Silence" was sponsored by the school, the only
question left to ask is whether the school's refusal to allow Harper to wear
his T-shirt was related to "legitimate pedagogical concerns." To answer
this question affirmatively, the court might have pointed to any number of
facts in the case. The court could have found that the school took action
against Harper to "reduce tensions and potential altercations," as it had
227.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1171.
228.
Id.
229.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
230.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d
1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-57037).
231.
Id. at 9.

232. Id. at 10.
233. Answer, at 4 n.1, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.
2006) (No. 04-57037).
234. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
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attempted to do before the "Day of Silence" had happened.235 The court
also might have justified the school's actions by taking the word of
Harper's second period teacher, David LeMaster, when he said that
Harper's T-shirt "violated the School's dress code" and "created a negative
and hostile working environment for others. 236 Assistant Principal Lynell
Antrim told Harper that his shirt was inflammatory and had the potential to
disrupt the school environment, which is another legitimate and pedagogical concern.237 Clearly, any number of legitimate concerns might have
justified the "editorial control" that the school exercised over Harper after
the school-sponsored "Day of Silence" to bring his case within the
framework of Hazelwood.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When a panel majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
a derogatory T-shirt worn by Tyler Harper intruded upon the rights of
homosexual students, it justified its holding by emphasizing the need for
minority students to receive special protection in the school environment.
This holding produced a scathing dissent from one of the judges on the
panel, who accused the majority of stretching facts of the case to fit the
holding that it wished to endorse. To possibly achieve a greater consensus
and more clarity to its holding, the Ninth Circuit might have chosen to
apply another prong of the case that it chose for its analysis, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District, and chosen to follow precedent from
another Circuit to support its reasoning that Harper's T-shirt might have
forecast substantial disruption of the school environment. The court also
might have chosen to follow the precedent of Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraserto find that Harper's T-shirt was offensive to other students
and interfered with the school's duty of inculcating proper values to
students. Finally, the court might have chosen to follow Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier to find that Poway High School did not open a public
forum with the "Day of Silence," and thus had a legitimate, pedagogical
reason to exercise editorial control over Harper's T-shirt. The court
reached the right outcome in Harperv. Poway Unified School District, but
there may have been other, better ways to achieve that outcome.
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